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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RICHARD DOUGLAS HACKFORD, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
ROZANNA VALDEZ, RAYMOND VALDEZ, 
and JONATHON D. HACKFORD, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant 
to §78-2a-3 (2) (b) as this is an appeal from a final decision 
of the Eighth Circuit Court, Uintah County, State of Utah 
denying plaintiff's cause of action seeking eviction pursuant 
to U.C.A. §78-36-2 et seq. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Is the oral lease agreement between the parties 
void for a failure of a meeting of the minds on essential 
terms? 
2. Is the lease agreement void against public policy 
because it was an agreement to divest respondent of assets so 
that she would qualify for welfare and then get the property 
back when she no longer required public assistance? 
Case No. 890727-CA 
Category No. 14b 
3. Is a lease agreement that requires a tenant to 
divorce her husband and clean up her life void as being 
against public policy and for vagueness? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS OR STATUTES 
See Statutory Appendix 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Plaintiff and defendant are brother and sister. 
(Court Findings of Fact No. 2) 
2. The property in question is a home and real 
property located in Uintah County, Utah. 
3. On or about July 27, 1983, the Seventh Judicial 
District Court, the Honorable Richard Davidson presiding, 
entered an order quieting title to the home and land in 
plaintiff Richard Douglas Hackford and defendant Rosanna Faye 
Hackford. (See plaintiff's Exhibit "A") 
4. On or about April 11, 1985, the defendant Rosanna 
Hackford Valdez signed a Quit-Claim Deed to the property quit 
claiming her interest to plaintiff. (See Exhibit "B") 
5. In July of 1985 plaintiff entered into a 
stipulation settling claims with other defendants regarding 
plaintiff's interest in the home. (See Exhibit "C") 
6. The defendant moved into the home sometime in July 
of 1985. (TR 22) 
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7. Rosanna Hackford Valdez transferred her ownership 
interest in the subject property to plaintiff in an attempt to 
remove all assets from her name so that she would qualify for 
public assistance. (Court Finding of Fact No, 3) 
8. Plaintiff testified that it was his understanding 
of the oral agreement that defendant could live in the home so 
long as she divorced her husband, cleaned up her life, paid 
taxes on the property, and eventually got off welfare. 
Plaintiff further testified that if she lived up to the above 
standards for seven years he would consider giving her an 
interest in the property. (Court Finding of Fact Nos. 5, 6 & 
7, R. 95) 
9. Defendant testified that she signed over her 
interest in the home to plaintiff so that she could go on 
welfare and that she would get her interest back in the home 
when she no longer needed welfare. (Court Finding of Fact No. 
3) (TR 80) 
10. During the term of the tenancy a disagreement 
arose between the parties concerning the alleged entry of the 
plaintiff onto the residence of the subject property. (Court 
Finding of Fact No. 8) 
11. Criminal charges were filed as a result of the 
alleged entry of the plaintiff into Mrs. Valdez1 residence. 
(Court Finding of Fact No. 9) 
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12. On or about January 24, 1989, plaintiff served 
upon defendant a Notice to Quit and Vacate the Premises by 
March 1, 1989. (R-l) 
13. On or about March 14, 1989, defendants were 
served with a five day Summons and Complaint. (R.8) 
14. The defendants filed an answer seeking dismissal 
on the grounds that the court lacked jurisdiction over the 
defendants. (R.ll) 
15. The matter came before the Court for trial on 
July 28, 1989. The court took the matter under advisement. 
(R.64) 
16. The court issued its Ruling on or about October 
3, 1989. (R.88) 
17. The court signed Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law and Order on or about October 10, 1989. (R.96) 
18. On or about October 20, 1989, plaintiff filed a 
motion to alter or amend the judgment. (R.103) 
19. On or about November 22, 1989, the court issued a 
ruling on plaintiff's motion to alter or amend the judgment 
(R.105) and the court signed an order denying plaintiff's 
motion to alter or amend the judgment on or about December 5, 
1989. (R.106) 
20. Plaintiff then filed a notice of appeal on 
December 14, 1989. (R.110) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In order to have a valid, enforceable lease creating a 
tenancy other than a tenancy at will, there must be a meeting 
of the minds as to essential terms of the lease. 
Specifically, the lease agreement must be definite as to the 
rental consideration and term of the lease. In the case at 
hand neither the term of the lease nor the consideration was 
ever agreed upon by the parties. 
Plaintiff testified that the term of the lease was up 
to seven years so long as defendant divorced her husband and 
cleaned up her life. Defendant testified that the lease was 
in essence open ended and she was to receive an ownership 
interest in the property when she got off welfare assistance. 
There was therefore no meeting of the minds as to the term of 
the lease. 
Additionally, there was no agreement as to 
consideration. Plaintiff testified that defendant could live 
in the home so long as she divorced her husband and cleaned up 
her life. The consideration for the lease is void for 
vagueness and public policy considerations. Plaintiff's 
conditions on the lease violated public policy because they 
require defendant to divorce her husband and clean up her life 
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in order to remain in the home. Defendant's statement that 
the consideration for the lease is that she signed over her 
interest in the property to hide the asset so as to qualify 
for welfare and expected plaintiff to give her interest back 
to her when she no longer needed public assistance is void 
against public policy. Under either parties testimony the 
agreement is void for vagueness and as against public policy. 
The tenancy created is a tenancy at will. Plaintiff is 
entitled to an order reversing the decision of the Circuit 
Court and requiring defendant to vacate the premises. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS A 
MEETING OF THE MINDS SUFFICIENTLY CLEAR TO CREATE A TENANCY 
FOR YEARS. 
There are essentially four types of tenancies 
recognized in Utah, to-wit: a tenancy for years; a periodic 
tenancy; a tenancy at will; or a tenancy at sufferance. See 
Summary of Utah Real Property Law, Vol. 2, p. 568-571, BYU 
Legal Studies 1978. 
A tenancy for years is a lease that is limited to a 
definite period. The end of the period either has been 
determined or can readily be determined from the terms of the 
lease. See Jacobson v. Swan, 3 Utah 2d 59, 68, 278 P.2d 294, 
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300 (1954). A perpetual lease is disfavored in the law. 
Supra, n.21. A tenancy at will exists where there is no set 
period for the lease and the tenant may remain in possession 
of the property until notice of termination is given by either 
party. See Shoemaker v. Pioneer Investment Company, 14 Utah 
2d 250, 252, 381 P.2d 735, 736 (1963). 
If the agreement in this case is a tenancy at will 
then the plaintiff effectively terminated the tenancy by way 
of his notice to quit. In order for the tenancy to continue 
after plaintiff's notice to quit there must be a valid tenancy 
agreement for a specific term, or in other words, a tenancy 
for years. A review of the facts in this case will indicate 
that there was a lack of meeting of the minds sufficient to 
establish a tenancy for years. 
Leases are subject to the same rules governing 
interpretation as are contracts. See Pingree v. Continental 
Group of Utah, Inc., 558 P.2d 1317 (Utah 1976). In order for 
a contract to be enforceable the contract must be definite as 
to its terms and there must be a meeting of the minds between 
the parties. Owyhee, Inc. v. Robbins Marco Polo, 17 Utah 2d 
181, 407 P.2d 565 (1965). 
In Pingree the issue was the enforceability of a 
clause of a lease granting a renewal option. In Pingree the 
-7-
lease provision itself stated: 
Lessee shall have and is hereby granted the 
option to renew this lease for two separate 
additional five year terms, commencing on the 
first month following the expiration of the term 
of the lease upon the same terms and conditions 
contained herein, except that the rental amount 
will be renegotiated; however, maximum total 
monthly rental shall not exceed $900 per month. 
The parties could not agree on the renewal rent and the trial 
court set the amount at $900 per month. On appeal the Supreme 
Court reversed that issue determining that the option itself 
was too vague and indefinite to be enforceable. As the Court 
stated: 
A condition precedent to the enforcement of any 
contract is that there be a meeting of the minds 
of the parties, which must be spelled out, 
either expressly or impliedly, with sufficient 
definiteness to be enforced. 
Id. at 1321 
In discussing the rule regarding extensions, the Court 
stated: 
The majority rule, in essence, is that a± 
provision for the extension or renewal ojE a 
lease must specify the time the lease is to 
extend and the rate of rent to be paid with such 
degree of certainty and definiteness that 
nothing is left for future determination. If it 
falls short of this requirement, it is not 
enforceable. 
Id. The above provision clearly applies to the original 
lease agreement as well. 
In discussing the problems associated with the court 
determining a reasonable rental amount the Supreme Court 
stated: 
In the current matter the court implied the 
parties had agreed upon a reasonable rental 
figure which the court proceeded to determine. 
This interpretation had the effect of nullifying 
the express factors specified by the parties, 
and substituting a new agreement to which the 
parties had not committed themselves. 
To attempt by judicial fiat to substitute 
the legal concept of reasonable rental in 
lieu of the previous follow design of a 
fluctuating rental, measured by future 
uncontrolled and uncontrollable 
conditions, would, indeed, be to remake 
the contract for the parties a very 
possibly frustrate what appears to be a 
very important contrary intent concerning 
the rental amount. 
The option to renew was too vague and indefinite 
to be enforceable and the lease terminated by 
its own terms. . . . 
Id. 
Thus, three essential elements for a lease are 
description of the property, duration of the term and rental 
consideration. See Bennett v. Pratt, 365 P.2d 622 (Or. 1961) 
In the case at hand the only actual agreement between 
the parties based upon their testimony was that both parties 
agreed that the defendant would pay the property taxes on the 
property while she lived there. Plaintiff testified that his 
understanding was that she would also have to divorce her 
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husband, clean up her act and eventually get welfare or seek 
to get off welfare during the term of the lease in order to 
comply with its provisions. (F.5-7) Defendant testified that 
the purpose of the lease agreement was that she signed over 
her interest in the property in order to qualify for welfare 
assistance and that she was to receive her interest in the 
property back when she no longer needed public assistance. 
(F.3) Defendant placed no termination date whatsoever on the 
expiration period of the lease. In this case there was no 
meeting of the minds as to the lease term or its underlying 
consideration. A lease agreement without a definite term is a 
tenancy at will. Indeed, the court could not set a term for 
the lease even though plaintiff requested a specific finding 
in his motion filed pursuant to Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
Moreover, as sometimes is the case when dealing with 
family members, the parties never did reach an understanding 
as to the actual terms of consideration for this lease 
agreement. In its Ruling, the court threw out the plaintiff's 
consideration as being void against public policy. The Court 
held, however, that there was a valid lease agreement allowing 
defendant to live in the home so long as she received public 
assistance and paid the property taxes. The court's ruling 
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had the effect of creating what potentially is a life estate 
at a very good price for defendant, leaving plaintiff with no 
recourse. Under the circumstances there is no basis for a 
conclusion of law that there was a meeting of the minds in 
this matter and the trial court's determination is erroneous. 
Because there is no meeting of the minds what the parties are 
left with is a tenancy at will which the plaintiff is free to 
terminate at will. Because the plaintiff terminated the 
tenancy by way of notice to quit the plaintiff is entitled to 
immediate possession of the property. This Court should 
reverse the trial court's determination that there was a 
meeting of the minds sufficient to create a lease agreement 
for a period of years. 
POINT II 
THE LEASE AGREEMENT IS VOID AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY AS A 
SCHEME TO DEFRAUD THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES BECAUSE 
THE DEFENDANT SIGNED HER INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY TO QUALIFY 
FOR WELFARE WITH THE EXPECTATION OF RECEIVING THE PROPERTY 
BACK WHEN SHE NO LONGER NEEDED PUBLIC ASSISTANCE. 
Based upon the court's Findings of Fact that the 
defendant signed her interest in the property over to 
plaintiff under an agreement to avoid discovery of assets so 
that she could qualify for welfare, the lease is void as 
against public policy. It is a stated public policy of this 
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state that individuals should rely upon their own income and 
assets to support themselves before resorting to public 
assistance. U.C.A. §62A-9-116 requires: 
Applicants and recipients shall execute forms 
provided by the office describing all property 
owned, all insurance owned by any members of the 
immediate family, and all income available, in 
accordance with federal law and regulation. 
U.C.A. §62A-9-117 provides: 
Ownership of money or other tangible property 
where it is equivalent in real or personal 
property, shall disqualify an applicant or 
recipient from receiving aid to families with 
dependent children under subsection 62A-9-114(I) 
if the following limits are exceeded: 
(1) A dwelling which the individual occupies as 
a home; the lot on which the home is located, in 
accordance with limits established by federal 
law or regulation; and the furniture and 
furnishings therein, in accordance with limits 
established by federal law or regulations. 
Moreover, §62A-9-127 provides: 
If while receiving public assistance a recipient 
is possessed of income or resources in excess of 
the amount previously reported by him it is his 
duty to notify the office of this fact in 
accordance with state law and federal 
regulations. 
In this case, the court found, as the defendant 
testified, that the purpose of her signing over her interest 
in the property was to qualify for public assistance and that 
she expected the property be returned to her when she no 
longer needed public assistance. (F.3)(TR 80-81) This 
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expectancy interest is an asset that was not disclosed to the 
department of social services when the defendant applied for 
benefits and therefore it is clearly against the public policy 
of this state to enforce this type of an agreement. Although 
the plaintiff disputes the defendant's testimony regarding the 
purpose and terms of the agreement, the court accepted the 
defendant's version in its Findings of Fact No, 3 and the 
agreement itself is void as against public policy. As the 
Utah Court stated in Fraley v. McCoy, 211 P.2d 840, 847 "there 
can be no doubt concerning the duty of this court to 
invalidate contracts which have a tendency to be injurious to 
the public welfare." (Utah 1949) 
In this case the contract provision is void as against 
public policy and the agreement resorts to a tenancy at will 
under the court's construction of the facts as it applies to 
the law. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF'S VERSION OF THE AGREEMENT THAT THE 
DEFENDANT MUST DIVORCE HER HUSBAND AND CLEAN UP HER LIFE 
RENDERS THE AGREEMENT VOID FOR VAGUENESS AND AGAINST PUBLIC 
POLICY. 
Although the court appeared to believe the defendant's 
version over the plaintiff's in its Findings of Fact, the 
court indicated that the plaintiff's statement that defendant 
had to clean up her life if believed would be void for 
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vagueness. It would be quite clearly impossible for a court 
or anyone to determine what cleaning up one's life means and 
therefore the court correctly held that that part of the 
agreement is void for vagueness. 
An additional provision that the court construed in 
the testimony regarded the plaintiff's statement that the 
defendant must divorce her husband as a condition of the 
agreement. The court correctly held that, if true, this 
agreement would be void as against public policy. In Nelson 
v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court 
affirmed the cause of action for intentional alienation of 
affections in the marital context. As the Court stated: 
The law protects many relational interests . . . 
We have repeatedly sustained a plaintiff's right 
to recover for *the loss of society, Love, 
companionship, protection and affection which 
usually constitute the heart of the action'. 
(Citations omitted) The marital relationship is 
entitled to as much protection as these. 
Id. at 1215. (Emphasis added) 
An agreement that intentionally requires a breakup of 
a marriage as a condition of that agreement wouLd therefore be 
a void provision against public policy of this state and the 
trial court correctly held that such an agreement is void as 
against public policy. The court erred however when it 
determined that there was an enforceable lease even though its 
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main provisions had been invalidated as against public policy. 
The court's Conclusions of Law are erroneous under any 
statement of the facts. If the court believed the plaintiff's 
testimony then the agreement is void for vagueness and as 
against public policy. If the court believes the defendants 
version of the agreement then the agreement is void as against 
public policy for hiding assets subject to welfare 
determination. Under either scenario the agreement between 
the parties is unenforceable as a matter of law and the 
tenancy created is a tenancy at will. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons the plaintiff requests that the 
Court reverse the determination of the Circuit Court and enter 
an order declaring the agreement between the parties to be a 
tenancy at will. 
DATED this 16th day of April, 1990. 
McRAE & DeLAND 
HARR^/H. SOUVALl^ 
Attorney for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, 
four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellant to Bruce M. Plenk, Utah Legal Services, Inc., 
Attorney for Respondent, 124 South 400 East, Salt Lake City, 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD DOUGLAS HACKFORD, 
RICKITA MARIE HACKFORD and 
ROSAKA FAYE HACKFORD VALDEZ, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JACK DUANE DOTTER, DARLA 




Civil No. 11,179 
This matter having come before the Court on May 25, 1983, 
for trial, the parties having appeared in person, the Plaintiffs 
being represented by Gayle F. McKeachnie and the Defendants by 
John C. Beaslin, the Court having heard the testimony of the 
parties and other witnesses, having received documentary 
evidence, and having made its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
1. Title to the following described property is vested in 
Richard Douglas Hackford, Richita Marie Hackford and Rosana Faye 
Hackford Vaidez. 
fc-^hibi+ A 
Township 1 South, Range 1 East, Uintah Special 
Meridian; 
Section 15: South half of the South half of the 
Southeast quarter of the Northeast quarter. 
Together with all improvements, appurtenances and water 
rights belonging thereto. 
2. The Warranty Deed dated December 17, 1977, recorded 
August 30, 1979, in Book, 253, Page 287, in the Uintah County 
Recorder's office is declared null and void. 
3. Except as specifically set forth herein, Jack Duane 
Dotter, Darla Gaye Dotter and Edith M. Hackford have no legal 
right or claim to the above described property and are hereby 
ordered to remove themselves from the premises within thirty (30) 
days from the date of this Order unless they remain there with 
the written consent of the Plaintiffs. 
49 Jack Duane Dotter and Darla Gaye Dotter are hereby 
granted a hearing at which they will be allowed the opportunity 
to present their evidence relating to their claim for relief 
under the occupancy claimant statute and at which time Plaintiffs 
will also be allowed the opportunity to present their claim for 
off-sets relating to Defendants1, Jack Duane Dotter and Darla 
Gaye Dotter, claim for relief under the occupancy claimant 
statute. 
The hearing on the issue of Defendant, Dotters', claim for 
reliefxunder the occupancy claimant statute is hereby set for the 
J)S^ day of -y~?jJlf/>) 1983, at fQ'pn ^.m. 
In order to enable the parties to be prepared for a hearing 
2 
on tliat date; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs, * • -' *• - I-;.:L. -i.tatives, 
agents and employees ?h?! i 1 *. allowed access re * ho house and 
undino premises for ' h*/ ; urpose of determine nc \;hat 
improvements have been made tc • .* :*: hv fhe Dot tors and 
the vaiu«; ' any such improvements, borr. access shall i <- allowed 
by Defendants upon twenty-four (24) hour rr * \ .• >: entry 
shall be at reasonable times. 
DATED this 2 7-day of July^-iSF37) r 
Richard C. Davidson 
District Judce 
Wr 
O / VI 
3 
L
 tyhibii B u. 
, M . tft&dtf-.f S , Recorded at requmt ^ ^/&fp *• J&firL*** >^ » MBUJ . . £ . 
. mo < ^B^ / t f / i f f at /&$.& M - • Jfafa* &n4eA4++<f^ i . . ^h County RecorcJe 
rZ6%7, ,l2..~   '*%7faf-(iitp  ^tf1* 
y! H i l ^TK DEEI 
FIChlTA KAFIE HACKFORD C0LLET1 and ROSAKA FAYF K ^ F O k r 
VAIIEZ, G r a r t c i s , he reby n m t i l a id ,m< convey t o FICHARD DOUGLAS 
bk^F > , - c - t e e , of P.ri IM-% 1 r *I . L a p o m t , t"ir^ P 4 f 'i B ^
 f f .: t h e 
s ^r c: 1EN DOLLARS (SI I 00) m o othe*- rroc a*ic valuable 
:;:.£:cera:;cr., 4 v. filR\)tj« dVteiibt-d property located m Uintah 
;:;::;., ?iate cf Utah, tc-*,it: 
I c v r s h i p 1 Sou th , Range 1 E a s t , U i n t a n S p e c i a l 
K e n d i a n : 
S e c t i o n 1 3 . bouit h a l f Soul [ hr | * , S o u t h e a s t q u a r t e r 
K c r t n e a s t c u a r t e i , 
«. * 
c : = 
:7**ISS the hand of s a i d G r a n t o r s t h i s / / * ~\ < + , • i l l , 
/ r- n 1j<: fr ,* ' i u *> 
R i c h i t c Mar ie Hackford C o l l e t t 
—
 w < - ^ / / / / / 7 
Rosana Fayp HacKford V^tdez ~^ 
S T A T 1 LI .K:^C<K > 
) s s 
coi-sn ci * - * ^ J u j 
/ 
<""" t h e v \ day cf Apr l J , 19HS, p e r s o n a l l y appea t nil luMuif 
r •. R i c h i c e K a n e Hacki*>n] f ' o l U t t , s iyn t r o l tlif f o r e g o i n g 
Plaintiffs ExhlbfJ # _. 3 
instrun.er.i, who duly acknowledged tc ire that she executed the 
same. 
My commission expires: 
\Vv^l 
-r > l \ £ ^ ' \ 
Notary Public 
Residing at ..^ .^  V./V -^J>JC.- '-^ v^ -,. 
STATE OF V_«w .-tc^ V. 
) ss. 
COUNTY O F ^ x O ^ O c X ) 
On the \\ day of April, 1985, personally appeared before 
me Rosana Faye Hackford Valdez, signer of the foregoing 
instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that she executed the 
same. 
My commission expires: 
\ W S M - A N 3 y ^ - ^ 
VAJIS^-*- 0"\ ** I 'V. ^ . O l * ^ - ', 
Notary Public 
Residing at .^syjLA ' Nc^ JCA C L U I 
2 
CLARK B . ALLRED 
GAYLE F. McKEACHNIE 
NIELSEN (, SENIOR 
A t t o r n e y s f o r P l a i n t i f f s 
363 E a s t K a i n S t r e e t 
Y e r r . a l , U t a h 6407E 
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 7e9-4906 
i'?: T::L SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
?• I CHARE DC/JGLAS KACKFORL, 
RICKISA KAF1E HACKFORD and 
ROSAKA FAYE HACKFORD VALDEZ,' 
Plaintiffs, 
\ s 
JACK DUAKE DOTTER, DARLA 




STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT 
AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Civil No n 
STIPULATION 
COME NOW the parties and hereby stipulate that the rem? 
i •  matter • k e settled and 
compromised ax :ollows: 
1 # ' -Defendants, Jack Dii.inf Dc»!„••«» •<»<:! Parlfl ilaye I of, Iter, 
Said Defendants, upon vacating the premises/^aaree to leave a 
C improvements installed on the premis^gV except as set forth 
herein, and agree that said improvements are in good condition 
vith onli reasonable W P M niifl h'ai , > •».rept M U M C \\ <H )• • nI- in the 
roof o f t he bathroom. 
2. Plaintiffs agree that Defendants may remove from the 
premises the tin shed/ the satellite T.V.# and •far rose bushes. 
Defendants will fill in any holes where the rose bushes were 
removed. 
3. refer.dc.ras hereby waive any claim for the value of any 
irrrc'versr.ts re the property except for the sum of ff2G0.00 for 
the cedar fence which Plaintiff hereby agrees to pay on or before 
June 1# 19£5. Fieintiff waives any claim for rent for the use of 
the property up to June 1, 1985. 
<• F2air.tif f agrees to pay all real property taxes 
renaming owing on the property. 
5. Both parties waive any right they have to appeal any 
decision made in this case. 
DATED this t^day of April, 1965. 
NIELSEN/*' SENIOR 
Attorney* for Plaintiffs 
Richard] 
^successor to^the interes/of 
/Richita Marie Hackford and Rosana 
Fay Hackford Valdez) 
McRAE 4 DeLAND 
Attorneys for Defendants 
By: 4:*tinu A *Jfu« + L» 
3 plum B. Stringham v 
/yack Duane Dotter 
t 
Darla Gaye Dotter 
ORDER 
Tin- CoJ i t having reviewed the S t i p u l a t i o n of t h e \^rtins and 
ttir.c f u : i \ advised l e r e H ,3,'if i,< 'I,!1 " - j j l a t i o i r ai.ci hereby 
; r.cc i pc i r i * « IJ,I « i i pule t IOIJ he re in as the (oo! " L> Order and 
c r c - r s t c i c {.cit ies i t co~ip3v v . e i t ' v : ! ) i1)." • ' • t vacating of 
-he pxen. ises , i„ M u-j". < .lunt J, l i l ^ , i«y tue Defencar-tb and the-
pei forr*ance of the et.Sei d u t i e s <. ' * h* p & i t i e s f ' jv Mr' 1 n be-, it 
? t i p u 2 a t i c n # the Court Onitji « in. . i M r*?e i r d i smissed with 
pi e ;; v )ci ice • 
CA?E;D t h i s 5 " d£i of A p r i l , I f f 5 . 
Richard C. Davidson 
D i s t r i c t Judge 
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PUBLIC ASSISTANCE 62A-9-117 
62A-9-116- Disclosure of income and property owned. 
Applicants and recipients shall execute forms provided by the office describ-
ing all property owned, all insurance owned by any members of the immediate 
family* and all income available, in accordance with federal law and regula-
tion. 
History: C. 1953, 62A-9-116, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 1, § 408 
1988, ch. 1, § 233. makes the act effective on January 19, 1988. 
62A-9-117. Property ownership disqualifying applicant or 
recipient from Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children — Limits. 
Ownership of money or other tangible property, or its equivalent in real or 
personal property, shall disqualify an applicant or recipient from receiving 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children, under Subsection 62A-9-114Q), if 
the following limits are exceeded: 
(1) a dwelling which the individual occupies as a home; the lot on 
which the home is located, in accordance with limits established by fed-
eral law or regulation; and the furniture and furnishings therein, in ac-
cordance with limits established by federal law or regulation; 
(2) equity value in an automobile, not exceeding amounts established 
by federal law or regulation; 
(3) money, or its equivalent in other real or personal property in any 
combination, not exceeding amounts established by federal law or regula-
tion; 
(4) life insurance policies not exceeding amounts established by federal 
law or regulation. Any aggregate cash value in excess of the amounts 
established by federal law or regulation shall be counted as a resource as 
required by this section; 
(5) ownership or beneficial interest in any land or account which is 
held in trust by the United States, this state, or in a tribal account; 
(6) in addition to the limitations of Subsections (1) through (4), interest 
in a trust fund or trust funds created under Chapter 4, Title 22 not ex-
ceeding amounts established by federal law or regulation. 
History: C. 1953,62A-9-117, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 1, § 408 
1988, ch. 1, § 234. makes the act effective on January 19, 1988. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Personal injury recovery as affect-
ing eligibility for, or duty to reimburse, public 
welfare assistance, 80 A.L.R.3d 772. 
Income tax refund as income or resource to 
be considered in determining eligibility for 
benefits under Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children Program, 3 A.L.R.4th 1074. 
Eligibility for welfare benefits as affected by 
claimant's status as trust beneficiary, 21 
A.L.R.4th 729. 
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62A-9-126 SOCIAL SERVICES CODE 
62A-9-126. Enforcement of provisions — County attorney 
— Attorney general. 
The office may take legal action necessary to enforce this chapter. At the 
request of the office, it is the duty of the county attorney to represent the office 
in any legal actions. The county attorney or attorney general, upon being 
advised of violation of this chapter, shall institute legal proceedings necessary 
to enforce this chapter. If the county attorney fails to act within 30 days after 
request, the office may request the attorney general to act and he shall as-
sume the responsibilities and carry the action forward in place of the county 
attorney. 
History: C. 1953, 62A-9-126, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 1, § 408 
1988, ch. 1, $ 243. makes the act effective on January 19, 1988. 
62A-9-127. Duty to report income and resources. 
If, while receiving public assistance, a recipient is possessed of income or 
resources in excess of the amount previously reported by him, it is his duty to 
notify the office of this fact in accordance with state law and federal regula-
tions. 
History: C. 1953, 62A-9-127, enacted by L, tionsH for "immediately" at the end of the sec-
1988, ch. 1, § 244; 1988, ch. 242, § 26. tion. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 1, § 408 
ment, effective Apnl 25, 1988, substituted "in makes the act effective on January 19, 1988. 
accordance with state law and federal regula-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Personal injury recovery as affect- benefits under Aid to Families with Dependent 
ing eligibility for, or duty to reimburse, public Children Program, 3 A L.R.4th 1074. 
welfare assistance, 80 A.L.R.3d 772. Eligibility for welfare benefits as affected by 
Income tax refund as income or resource to claimant's status as trust beneficiary, 21 
be considered in determining eligibility for A L R.4th 729. 
62A-9-128. False statements, misrepresentation — Prohib-
ited acts — Violation. 
(1) No person may knowingly, by false statement, misrepresentation, im-
personation, or other fraudulent means fail to disclose any reduction in house-
hold composition, employment changes, changes in marital status, receipt of 
other monetary assistance, receipt of in-kind gifts, or any other material fact 
or change in circumstances used in making, or which would affect, the deter-
mination of that person's eligibility to receive public assistance under any 
state or federally-funded program. 
(2) No person who provides a service for which compensation is paid under 
any state or federally-funded assistance program may solicit, request, or re-
ceive, actually or constructively, any payment or contribution through a pay-
ment, assessment, gift, devise, bequest or other means, directly or indirectly, 
from a recipient of assistance from that program, or such a recipient's family, 
unless that person notifies the department, on a form it provides, of the 
amount of that payment or contribution, together with such other information 
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CUlKT UY APPEALS 78-2a-3 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs 
and to issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative pro-
ceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of 
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Ser-
vice Commission, State Tax Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of 
Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of adjudicative proceedings of 
agencies of political subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from the small claims 
department of a circuit court; 
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(0 appeals from district court in criminal cases, except those involving 
a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs involving a 
criminal conviction, except those involving a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, in-
cluding but not limited to divorce, annulment, property division, child 
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals, upon its own motion only and by the vote of four 
judges of the court, may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate 
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has 
original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Chapter 
46b, Title 63, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-3, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 47, § 46; 1987, ch. 161, § 304; 1988, 
ch. 73, § 1; 1988, ch. 210, j 141; 1988, ch. 
248, § 8. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
ment by Laws 1988, Chapter 73, effective April 
25, 1988, inserted subsection designations (a) 
and (b) in Subsection (1); inserted "resulting 
from formal adjudicative proceedings" in Sub-
section (2)(a); substituted "state agencies" for 
"state and local agencies" in Subsection (2)(a); 
substituted "informal adjudicative proceedings 
of the agencies" for "them" in Subsection (2)(a); 
deleted "notwithstanding any other provision 
of law" at the end of Subsection (2Xa); inserted 
Subsection (b); redesignated former Subsec-
tions (2Kb) to (2)(h) as Subsections (2)(c) to 
(2)(i); added "except those from the small 
claims department of a circuit court" at the end 
of Subsection (2)(d); and made minor stylistic 
changes. 
The 1988 amendment by Laws 1988, Chap-
ter 210, effective April 25,1988, added Subsec-
tion (2Kb) and redesignated former Subsection 
(2)(h) as Subsection (2)(i). 
The 1988 amendment by Laws 1988, Chap-
ter 248, effective April 25, 1988, in Subsection 
(2)(a), rewrote the phrase before "except" 
which had read "the final orders and decrees of 
state and local agencies or appeals from the 
district court review of them"; deleted "not-
withstanding any other provision of law" at the 
end of Subsection (2Xa); inserted present Sub-
section (2Kb); designated former Subsections 
(2Kb) to (2Kb) as Subsections (2Kc) to (2)(i); and 
substituted "first degree or capital felony" for 
"first or capital degree felony" in present Sub-
section (2Xf). 
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FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER 78-36-2 
and tenant, and not one of innkeeper and 
guest, the occupants could only be dispossessed 
of the apartment by resort to the statutory 
remedy of unlawful detainer When the owner 
of the motel locked out the occupants for 
unpaid rent, there was an unlawful eviction 
Lambert v Sine, 123 Utah 145, 256 P 2d 241 
(1953) 
Policy of section. 
—Abolishment of common-law. 
The forcible entry statute expressed a policy 
that no person should enter by force, stealth, 
fraud or intimidation, premises of which an-
other had peaceable possession This had the 
effect of taking away the common-law nght of 
a landlord to possess his own property by no 
more force than was necessary and left the one 
against whom force was used to pursue his 
common-law action Buchanan v Cntes, 106 
Utah 428, 150 P 2d 100,154 A L R 167 (1944) 
Purpose of provisions. 
—Preventing disturbances of peace. 
The forcible entry and detainer statute was 
enacted for the primary purpose of preventing 
disturbances of the peace brought about 
through self-help in the matter of disposses-
sion King v Firm, 3 Utah 2d 419, 285 P2d 
1114 (1955) 
—Summary remedy. 
Purpose of this statute is to provide a speedy 
remedy, summary in character, to obtain pos-
session of real property Paxton v Fisher, 86 
Utah 408, 45 P 2d 903 (1935) 
Rent. 
This chapter provides a summary remedy for 
the recovery of real property in case of forcible 
entry or the forcible or unlawful detainer 
thereof That is the purpose of the chapter, and 
not to deal with the subject of remedies for 
rent The question of rent is drawn into the 
statute, not for the purpose of providing a rem-
edy for its recovery, but to complete a case of 
unlawful detainer, which is the gist of the ac-
tion Voyles v Straka, 77 Utah 171,292 P 913 
(1930) 
Separate tort action. 
A landlord who is entitled to possession 
must, on the refusal of the tenant to surrender 
the premises, resort to the remedy given by 
law to secure it A violation of that duty set by 
the statute gives rise to an action for damages, 
not in an action under the forcible entry and 
detainer statute but as a separate tort King v 
Firm, 3 Utah 2d 419, 285 P 2d 1114 (1955) 
What constitutes forcible entry. 
—Removal of doors. 
Where defendant landlord entered upon the 
premises in plaintiffs absence by unlocking 
the doors and removing the doors from their 
hinges and carrying them away, the weather 
being at the time freezing, these facts were 
held to sufficiently show a forcible entry Bu-
chanan v Cntes, 106 Utah 428, 150 P 2d 100, 
154 A L R 167 (1944) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Landlord-Tenant 
Law A Perspective on Reform in Utah, 1981 
Utah L Rev 727, 738 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 35 Am Jur 2d Forcible 
Entry and Detainer § 1 
C.J.S. — 36A C J S Forcible Entry and De-
tainer §§ 1, 2 
Key Numbers. — Forcible Entry and De-
tainer *» 4 
78-36-2. "Forcible detainer" defined. 
Every person is guilty of a forcible detainer who either: 
(1) by force, or by menaces and threats of violence, unlawfully holds 
and keeps the possession of any real property, whether the same was 
acquired peaceably or otherwise; or, 
(2) in the nighttime, or during the absence of the occupants of any real 
property, unlawfully enters thereon, and, after demand made for the sur-
render thereof, refuses for the period of three days to surrender the same 
to such former occupant. The occupant of real property within the mean-
ing of this subdivision is one who within five days preceding such unlaw-
ful entry was in the peaceable and undisturbed possession of such lands. 
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Rule 59 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 59, New trials; amendments of judgment. 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be 
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of 
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an 
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been 
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of 
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new 
judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, 
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was 
prevented from having a fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors 
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a 
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a 
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be 
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have 
guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the ap-
plication, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered 
and produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given 
under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, 
or that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later 
than 10 days after the entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is 
made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affida-
vit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be 
served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service 
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affida-
vits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional 
period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by 
the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment 
the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it 
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall 
specify the grounds therefor. 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment A motion to alter or amend the 
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to Juror's competency as witness as to validity 
Rule 59, F.R.C.P. of verdict or indictment, Rules of Evidence, 
Cross-References. — Fee for filing motion Rule 606. 
for new trial, § 21-2-2. 
Harmless error not ground for new trial, 
Rule 61. 
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